Published Journal Articles:

Channel choice and incentives in cadaveric organ supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research. 302(3), 1202-1214, 2022 (with Akansha Misra and Haritha Saranga)

Abstract: The low rate of cadaveric organ donation is a challenge that most countries struggle with. In this study, we examine factors and alternative decision-making setups that influence the supply of cadaveric organs, and identify possible incentives and mechanisms to increase it. We develop a model that captures the interaction between supply-side entities – a coordinating organisation, whose objective is to maximise the social welfare, and a hospital that performs the organ retrieval. Under different setups, we evaluate the two levers available to the coordinating organisation, its own effort and reimbursement fees, which can be used to induce higher effort by hospitals. We contrast these decisions and payoffs to determine if any benefits are forthcoming from the coordinating organisation’s effort commitment. We also examine the hospital’s optimal channel decision in the presence of an unauthorised channel and a low-paying authorised channel, and derive the conditions under which the hospital would prefer the authorised channel over the unauthorised channel. Our results provide insights that lead to better outcomes for the players and result in an improved organ donation rate. Read more

A pricing mechanism to improve capacity utilization in ridesharing. Journal of the Operational Research Society. 73(4), 741-753, 2022 (with Srikanth Krishnaprasad)

Abstract: Low vehicle occupancy is an issue faced by many ridesharing platforms. One of the ways to address this issue is to design a pricing mechanism that incentivises riders to join large pools. In this study, we propose a pricing mechanism and a decision rule to aid the platforms in achieving high capacity utilisation (forming large pools), even in the presence of rider inconveniences. We factor in inconveniences due to both detouring and sharing of personal space while designing the mechanism. The proposed mechanism incentivises riders to join the “largest-size” pool and also ensures that no rider benefits at the cost of others. The decision rule helps to identify the right participants to share a ride. We employ cooperative game theory for this study. Read more

Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities. Operations Research Letters. 44(2), 219-224, 2016 (with R K Amit)

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to develop a solution concept for the stability of coalitional games with externalities. The existing solution concepts for this class of coalitional games can be empty. Using the partition function form representation, we propose a new solution concept called ‘equivalence nucleolus’, which is shown to be unique and always non-empty. Read more

Optimal shelf-space stocking policy using stochastic dominance under supply-driven demand uncertainty. European Journal of Operational Research, 246(1), 339-342, 2015 (with R K Amit and Peeyush Mehta)

Abstract: In this paper, we develop an optimal shelf-space stocking policy when demand, in addition to the exogenous uncertainty, is influenced by the amount of inventory displayed (supply) on the shelves. Our model exploits the stochastic dominance condition, and we assume that the distribution of realized demand with a higher stocking level stochastically dominates the distribution of realized demand with a lower stocking level. We show that the critical fractile with endogenous demand may not exceed the critical fractile of the classical newsvendor model. Our computational results validate the optimality of the amount of units stocked on the retail shelves. Read more